PATTERNS
OF
POWER

May God See and Judge

The East–West Schism and the Two Architectures of Authorisation

800 — 1054 — 1204

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with Claude (Anthropic)

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Held as tested, not revealed.
A case study in the Patterns of Power series.

Primary sources quoted exactly; modern scholarship paraphrased and credited.
Contested figures given as ranges. Nothing reconstructed from memory.

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PREFACE AND OUTLINE

Front matter · how this study was made, the disciplines it holds itself to, and a map of its fourteen parts

The collaboration

This is a case study in the Patterns of Power series, applying the series' framework to the division between Latin and Orthodox Christendom — from the coronation of Charlemagne in 800, through the excommunications of July 1054 and the sack of Constantinople in 1204, to the union of Florence and the fall of the eastern empire. The framework is a lens for reading how any order of power is founded, dressed and held: the floor of force, the robe of doctrine laid over it, the settlement that divides the spoils, the cost column, the seam through which beliefs are managed, the default by which an elite coordinates without instruction, and position logic beneath it all.

The study was built one module at a time. The author brought the framework and the governing question; Claude, Anthropic's model, did the research and produced the drafts. Where the research contradicted the framework's expectation, the research was followed.

What this case isolates

This is the seventh study in a sequence and it was taken up to test a hypothesis: **that the eastern schism, unlike the western one, affected nobody's title — and that this would change the dynamics entirely.**

The hypothesis is correct, and the change is the whole case.

The preceding study examined the western schism of 1378, in which two men were elected by the same college in the same year. Every benefice, appeal, dispensation and episcopal appointment in Latin Europe ran through the office they both claimed. The instrument was destroyed instantly, without anybody doing anything wrong, and the damage was so intolerable that it was repaired in thirty-nine years — by importing an emperor with the force to convene a council and a claimant willing to convoke the body that would receive his resignation.

The eastern rupture transferred nothing. **The emperor at Constantinople was made by acclamation, by his army and senate, and crowned by a patriarch he himself appointed; no part of that chain ran through Rome. The pope after 800 crowned his own emperor and, after 1059, was elected by his own cardinals.** When Humbert laid his bull on the altar of Hagia Sophia on 16 July 1054, no title lapsed, no office was vacated, and nobody's holdings became insecure — which is why almost nobody noticed, why no serious scholar now dates the schism to 1054, and why it has lasted nine hundred and seventy years.

A rupture between two authorities is a legitimacy crisis only if one authorises the other, or if both draw on a common source whose occupancy is disputed. Where neither holds, it is a jurisdictional divorce — and a divorce that costs nothing generates no repair, indefinitely.

The case also supplies the sequence's clearest structural statement, and it completes an argument the western schism study began. An institution that decides collectively must locate its convening power somewhere. **Inside itself, where it can be disputed and forked — the western answer, which failed in 1378. Or outside itself, in a political office, where it can be lost — the eastern answer, which is why there has been no ecumenical council since 787, the emperor who convened them having ceased to exist in 1453.** There is no third option, because a body cannot convene itself without becoming a self-constituted authority, which Pisa demonstrated in 1409 by producing a third pope.

One church took both options, one in each half, and each suffered exactly the corresponding failure.

The problem of the sources

The documentary position is the weakest in this sequence and its weakness is itself a finding.

There is no archive of the schism, because there was no institution of it. There are two traditions that gradually stopped attending to each other, each documenting its own affairs well and the other's badly, with material on the relation concentrated at a few moments and thin between them.

Worse, **the framework's characteristic instrument requires an event**, and this division had none. The eleventh-century sources do not record a schism in 1054; they record a legate quarrelling with a patriarch. Neither side's canonists cited the affair as terminating communion, and one of the three legates became pope four years later. **The date was assigned by later historians working backwards from a division they**

knew existed and looking for a beginning. This study therefore dates the division four different ways in Module 7, according to what one takes it to consist of, and says which it prefers and why.

A further caution runs throughout. Where two parties cannot read each other's languages — and by 1054 educated westerners could not read Greek and educated easterners could not read Latin — their polemics degrade at a compounding rate, because each generation writes from the last one's caricature rather than from the thing. Humbert's bull accuses the Greeks of *removing* the filioque from the creed, which is exactly backwards.

No figures are given anywhere in this study for populations, casualties, revenue or army sizes, including for the sack of 1204, because the material does not support them.

And a statement of scope: **this study takes no position on the theological questions in dispute, on which ecclesiology is correct, or on the validity of the union of Florence.** Its analysis is structural, and its inability to adjudicate the theology is not evidence about the theology.

The disciplines

Five rules govern every module. **Quotation**: public-domain primary sources exactly, modern scholarship paraphrased and credited; where a saying is attributed but disputed — as with the remark ascribed to Loukas Notaras — it is given as attributed. **No fabrication**: nothing invented or reconstructed from memory. **Gravity without partisanship**: neither half is treated as the faithful one and neither as the deviant. **Legibility is not pardon.** And **held as tested, not revealed**.

What this case added to the framework

The central contribution is the eighth entry in the catalogue of failure modes: **divorce**, in which two authorities that authorise nothing for each other separate, at no cost to either — and which is therefore **permanent, because cost is the repair mechanism.** What is unbearable gets repaired; what is merely wrong does not.

From which the sequence's accumulated proposition can be stated as settled: **reach, capturability, forkability and corporate decisiveness are four faces of one property**, and no institution chooses among them separately. Durability and decisiveness trade against each other at a rate that is not negotiable.

Beneath those, findings the case forced. That **a polycentric constitution has a minimum viable plurality of three** — three poles contain a decision procedure and two contain none — so the pentarchy failed in the seventh century when the Arab conquests took Alexandria, Antioch and Jerusalem, and 1054 is merely when somebody tried to use it. That an order whose founding transaction is **within argumentative memory** will generate constitutional conflict and one whose founding is beyond it will not, which is why the West had an Investiture Contest and the East did not. That **an authority without a state develops a doctrine of supremacy over those who have one**, because supremacy is the only lever available to an institution whose sole instrument is a message — and the East, having a Christian emperor, never built the lever.

That a rupture becomes permanent when one party obtains **from a third source** what it had been seeking from the other: the papacy went east in 1054 to buy an army against the Normans, failed, and invested Robert Guiscard at Melfi five years later. That **a shared credential preserves recognition and a shared formation preserves intelligibility**, and the second can be lost while the first is kept — the two churches never stopped recognising each other's orders and stopped being able to argue productively. That **an institution's characteristic scandals follow from its funding position**: a church inside a state never invents an indulgence and ends with a patriarch appointed by a sultan; a church outside all states invents transnational taxation and ends with a Reformation.

That **monasticism is an institutional factory for producing unbuyable witnesses** — men who satisfy the incapacity condition permanently and by profession — which is why two emperors signed unions and neither could make them stick. That **a population is a party to any agreement requiring its participation**, whether or not it is represented at the negotiation, because participation cannot be compelled from people who can stay home. That **a division acquiring an atrocity transfers from the negotiators to the governed**, which is what 1204 did and why 1439 was unreceivable. And that **a deferred cost is a transferred cost**, falling due on whichever party is weakest when it arrives — which in this case was a dying empire buying an army with a doctrine and getting neither.

The arc

Landscape. *The Other Emperor.* An empire whose ruler appointed the patriarch, a bishop who had begun appointing emperors, and two hundred and fifty years in which neither side's title depended on the other.

1 — The Floor of Force. *Civitate.* A pope taken prisoner by Normans, an embassy sent east to buy an army, and the five years in which the papacy stopped needing Constantinople at all.

2 — The Settlement. *Three of the Five Were Gone.* An architecture designed for five poles, reduced by conquest to two, and the arithmetic that makes two the one number that cannot resolve a disagreement.

3 — The Robe. *Nothing Changed Hands.* An excommunication that transferred no title, and the reason a costless rupture is an unrepairable one.

4 — Formation. *Neither Could Read the Other.* Two halves that stopped sharing a language, then a genre, and finally the ability to conduct the argument at all.

5 — The Cost Column. *What It Cost to Stay Apart.* Four centuries of cheap divergence, and the single invoice that arrived in 1453.

6 — Extraction. *The Emperor Paid for It.* A church inside a treasury and a church outside every treasury, and why only one of them ever needed to invent an indulgence.

7 — Information and Suppression. *The Schism Was Dated Afterwards.* A rupture nobody recorded as a rupture, and the difficulty of studying a division that had no moment.

8 — Elite Coordination and the Default. *The Emperor Convened Them.* How the East solved the problem that destroyed the West in 1378, and the council that has not met since 787.

9 — Plurality or Foreclosure. *The Monks Said No.* An emperor who could depose a patriarch and could not move a population.

10 — Change and Collapse. *The Fourth Crusade.* The year a doctrinal difference became a memory of violence, and the four ways this schism could have ended, none of which happened.

11 — The Grim Accounting. *The Party That Paid.* A division whose costs were deferred, and then presented in full to one side.

12 — Convergence and Divergence. *Two Architectures.* The two ways of building a source of title and the two corresponding failures — with the strongest case for the eastern arrangement, stated fully and answered.

LANDSCAPE

THE OTHER EMPEROR

Landscape · the two orders on the eve — an empire whose ruler appointed the patriarch, a bishop who had begun appointing emperors, and two hundred and fifty years in which neither side's title depended on the other

The question this case answers

Begin with the question, because it is the right one and its answer runs against the intuition.

A schism is normally read as a crisis. This sequence has just examined one — the western schism of 1378 — which was a catastrophe: two men elected by the same college in the same year, an instrument destroyed without anybody doing anything wrong, thirty-nine years of ruinous double administration, and a repair that required an emperor's force and a claimant's convocation and was afterwards suppressed by the office it saved.

The eastern schism looks superficially similar and is structurally its opposite, and the reason is a single fact that has to be established before anything else.

Neither side's title depended on the other.

The emperor at Constantinople did not derive his authority from the bishop of Rome and never had. The bishop of Rome, by 1054, derived nothing from Constantinople and had not for two and a half centuries. When Humbert of Silva Candida laid a bull of excommunication on the altar of Hagia Sophia on 16 July 1054, and when Michael Keroularios's synod excommunicated the legates four days later, **no authorisation changed hands, no title lapsed, no office was vacated, and nobody's holdings became insecure.**

That is why almost nobody noticed at the time, why no serious scholar now maintains that the schism began in 1054, and why it has lasted nine hundred and seventy years.

Two answers to one question

But the divergence underneath was very old and it was constitutional.

In the East, the emperor authorised the patriarch. The emperor was the sacral centre of the order — acclaimed by army, senate and people, crowned by the patriarch of Constantinople, and understood in the political theology descending from Eusebius and Justinian as God's viceregent on earth, whose office was the earthly image of the heavenly monarchy. He appointed patriarchs. He deposed them. He convened the councils that defined the faith and enforced their decrees as imperial law. Justinian legislated for the church in the *Novellae* as a matter of course.

The textbook demonstration is the ninth century. Emperor Michael III engineered the deposition of the patriarch Ignatios in 858 and installed Photios, a layman and imperial kinsman, in his place. A later turn restored Ignatios. Basil I convened the council of 879–880 that restored Photios again. **Patriarchs were made and unmade by emperors, repeatedly, and the church did not regard this as a scandal requiring a doctrine.**

In the West, the bishop of Rome had begun authorising emperors. On Christmas Day 800 Leo III crowned Charlemagne. Whatever the intentions of the parties — and they are disputed — the act established a form: an emperor of the Romans, in the west, made by a pope. Two hundred years later the German kings were being crowned at Rome as a matter of routine, and the Investiture Contest of the following century would be fought over how much else followed from that.

Those are not two versions of one arrangement. They are opposite arrangements, and a single church cannot contain both, because they give contradictory answers to the one question this whole sequence has been asking: who authorises whom.

What that meant in practice

The consequence, by the eleventh century, was that the two halves had no transactions left to conduct.

The Byzantine emperor did not seek papal recognition; he regarded the western emperor as a barbarian pretender to his own title. The pope did not seek imperial confirmation of his election, though the Byzantine emperors had once given it, and by the reform of 1059 the papacy was legislating that the election belonged to the cardinals.

Two authorities with nothing to authorise for each other have nothing to lose by falling out, and that is the whole difference between 1054 and 1378.

The recursion

Both orders were naturalised former settlements and both had forgotten it.

The eastern arrangement descends from Constantine's establishment of the church and from Justinian's codification of the relation, and by the eleventh century nobody in Constantinople experienced imperial supervision of the church as an innovation; it was simply what an emperor was for. **A Christian empire in which the emperor convenes councils and appoints patriarchs had been the way the world worked for seven hundred years.**

The western arrangement descends from a much more recent and much more visible construction: the Carolingian settlement of the eighth century, in which a Frankish mayor of the palace obtained a papal opinion legitimating his seizure of a throne, and a pope obtained a Frankish protector against the Lombards. **That transaction is three hundred years old in 1054 and its terms were still being renegotiated**, which is why the West produced an Investiture Contest and the East did not.

What had actually accumulated

The list of differences by 1054 is long and almost all of it is downstream of the constitutional divergence.

The filioque — the western addition to the creed stating that the Spirit proceeds from the Father *and the Son*. It originated in Spain, was adopted in the Frankish church, was pressed by Charlemagne's theologians, and was resisted at Rome itself for two centuries before Rome accepted it in the early eleventh. The Greeks objected both to the doctrine and to the procedure: a creed defined by an ecumenical council could not, they held, be altered by one patriarchate acting alone. **That is a jurisdictional objection wearing a theological dress, and the jurisdictional objection is the real one.**

Azymes — the western use of unleavened bread in the Eucharist, which Keroularios made the occasion of his attack in 1052–53 and which reads to a modern eye as trivial and did not read that way then.

Clerical celibacy, married priests being normal in the East and increasingly forbidden in the West.

And the language. By the eleventh century Greek was effectively unread in the West and Latin effectively unread in the East. The two halves could no longer conduct an argument in a shared vocabulary, and the filioque dispute is partly a translation

problem: the Greek verb the creed uses for the Spirit's origination carries a sense of ultimate source that the Latin *procedere* does not.

Reading the eve against the framework

On the recursion, and it produces a distinction this collection has not needed before. Both halves were naturalised orders. What differed is **how recently and how visibly each had been built.**

The eastern settlement was seven centuries old and its origin was invisible; nobody argued about whether an emperor should convene councils, because that was simply the shape of the world. The western settlement was three centuries old, had been made in a documented transaction between identifiable men, and was still being litigated.

An order whose founding transaction is within argumentative memory will generate constitutional conflict; one whose founding is beyond it will not — and that predicts, correctly, that the Investiture Contest happened in the West and had no eastern equivalent. Not because the eastern church was more submissive but because the question had been settled so long ago that nobody had the materials to reopen it.

And the contribution the landscape makes, which is the finding this case exists to establish. Every schism examined in this sequence has been read as a legitimacy crisis. This one is not, and the diagnostic is precise.

A rupture between two authorities is a legitimacy crisis only if one of them authorises the other, or if both draw authorisation from a common source whose occupancy is in dispute. Where neither condition holds, the rupture is a **jurisdictional divorce**: it transfers no title, vacates no office, and makes nobody's holdings insecure.

The western schism of 1378 satisfied the second condition maximally and cost everything. The eastern schism satisfied neither and cost, at the moment it happened, nothing at all.

Which is why it was never repaired. A crisis that costs everything generates a repair within a generation. A divorce that costs nothing generates nothing, indefinitely — and the modules that follow are an examination of what an unrepaired divorce does over the following four centuries, which turns out to be a great deal, none of it urgent until it was fatal.

A note on sources.

The events of July 1054 — Humbert's laying of the bull on the altar of Hagia Sophia on 16 July, the legates' departure with the cry *Videat Deus et judicet*, and Keroularios's synod excommunicating the legates four days later — are standard, as is the fact that Leo IX had died on 19 April 1054 and that the legates' commission had therefore arguably lapsed. That the censures were personal rather than institutional, condemning Keroularios and his supporters on one side and the three legates on the other, is standard. That no serious scholar now dates the schism to 1054 is the current historiographical position and is stated as such.

The Byzantine political theology of the emperor as God's viceregent, descending from Eusebius and codified in Justinian's legislation including *Novella* 131, is standard; the term *caesaropapism* is contested in the scholarship and is not used here. The deposition of Ignatios in 858, the installation of Photios, the later reversals, and the council of 879–880 convened by Basil I are standard.

The coronation of Charlemagne by Leo III on Christmas Day 800, and the disputes over the parties' intentions, are standard. The papal election decree of 1059 is treated in the Investiture Contest study in this sequence.

The history of the *filioque* — its Spanish origin, Frankish adoption, Roman resistance and eventual Roman acceptance in the early eleventh century — is standard, as is the Greek objection on both doctrinal and procedural grounds and the translation difficulty between the Greek and Latin verbs. The dispute over azymes and Keroularios's closing of the Latin churches in Constantinople in 1052–53 are standard.

The distinction between a legitimacy crisis and a jurisdictional divorce, and the proposition that an order whose founding transaction is within argumentative memory will generate constitutional conflict, are this study's.

MODULE 1

CIVITATE

Module 1 · the floor of force — a pope taken prisoner by Normans, an embassy sent east to buy an army, and the five years in which the papacy stopped needing Constantinople at all

Why the legation went

The mission of 1054 is almost always described as a theological embassy. It was two things, and the second explains the first.

In June 1053 Leo IX had led an army in person against the Norman adventurers who were taking southern Italy. At Civitate he was beaten and captured. He spent months in Norman custody at Benevento and died in April 1054, some weeks after his release.

Southern Italy was the pressure point and it belonged, in law, to two parties. The Byzantine emperor held Apulia and Calabria and claimed the rest; the pope claimed ecclesiastical jurisdiction over parts of it that the patriarch of Constantinople also claimed. The Normans were taking it from both.

So Leo IX sent an embassy to Constantinople with a double commission: settle the ecclesiastical dispute, and obtain a military alliance against the Normans.

The man he sent to do it was Humbert of Silva Candida — a Lorrainer monk, a cardinal since 1050, and the author of a tract against the Greeks written before he left. He was not a diplomat and had not been chosen as one.

A negotiator dispatched to obtain an alliance from a party he had already denounced in print is not an accident of personnel. It is a statement about which of the two commissions the sender cared more about.

What happened instead

The negotiation collapsed. Keroularios refused to deal with the legates, disputing their credentials; the emperor Constantine IX, who wanted the alliance and had pressed for accommodation, could not compel his patriarch. On 16 July the legates entered Hagia Sophia during the liturgy, laid the bull on the altar, walked out, turned at the door and shouted *Videat Deus et judicet* — may God see and judge — and shook the dust from their feet.

They left the city two days later. The population was near rioting, and the sources record that the patriarch had the people with him and the emperor did not.

The alliance was not obtained.

What the papacy did next

And now the fact that decides the module, because it explains why the failure did not matter.

In August 1059, at Melfi, Nicholas II invested Robert Guiscard as duke of Apulia and Calabria and prospective duke of Sicily, and received his oath of fealty.

That is five years and one month after Humbert walked out of Hagia Sophia. The papacy had gone east to buy an army against the Normans, had failed, and had instead **hired the Normans** — investing with a lawful title the men who had just captured a pope and were in the process of stripping Byzantium of its Italian provinces.

The transaction is the one this sequence has examined from every angle: a warlord with no title obtaining one from the only party who could issue it, and paying in service. Robert Guiscard got a duchy over lands he had taken and lands he had not yet taken. The papacy got a floor.

From 1059 the papacy had a military protector in Italy and no further reason to want anything from Constantinople. It also had, in the same act, granted away Byzantine territory to Byzantium's enemies, which is not a step toward reconciliation.

Twenty-five years later Robert Guiscard's Normans would relieve Gregory VII from the Castel Sant'Angelo, sack Rome so thoroughly that the population drove the pope out, and leave him to die at Salerno — which is the subject of the Investiture study in this sequence and is the bill for the same purchase.

The floors on each side

Set the two orders' military positions side by side and the asymmetry explains the shape of everything that follows.

The East had a state. An emperor, a treasury, a standing army, a navy, a bureaucracy, a legal code, and a capital that had not fallen in seven hundred years. Its church was inside that state, funded by it, and defended by it. **The eastern church never had to acquire a floor because it stood on one.**

The West had a bishop. In 1054 the pope had the city of Rome unreliably, the patrimonies of St Peter, and whatever ally he could obtain. He had just been captured in the field. The whole subsequent history of the medieval papacy — the Norman alliance, the Matildine lands, the crusade, the papal states — is the history of an authority acquiring the floor it did not have.

And that asymmetry explains the divergence in doctrine. An institution that has a state does not need to argue that it is superior to states. An institution that has none must argue exactly that, because argument is the only instrument it possesses. Papal primacy in its high medieval form is what an authority produces when it has no army and needs one; the pentarchy is what an authority produces when the army is already there and belongs to a Christian emperor.

Reading the floor against the framework

The first finding, and it settles a question the Landscape opened. The rupture of 1054 was not caused by the theological quarrel and was not resolved by it. **It occurred at the moment the papacy was in the market for a floor, and it ceased to matter the moment the papacy found one elsewhere.**

That produces a diagnostic worth carrying: **the date at which a rupture becomes permanent is the date at which one party acquires from a third source whatever it had been seeking from the other.** Before 1059 the papacy needed Byzantine soldiers, and a reconciliation had a price somebody was willing to pay. After 1059 it did not, and there was nothing on the table.

Every subsequent attempt at reunion — 1274, 1439 — was initiated by the eastern side, under military pressure, and was refused or repudiated. **After 1059 the party with something to gain from the union was always the East, and the party that could set the terms was always the West**, which is why every union was a submission and why every submission failed.

And the second finding, on what an authority's military position does to its doctrine. This sequence has treated doctrine as a garment laid over a floor to make force cheap. This case shows a different relation: **an authority without a floor develops a doctrine of supremacy over those who have one, because supremacy is the only lever available to an institution whose sole instrument is a message.**

That is not a claim that papal primacy was insincere; it was believed, argued from scripture and precedent, and held by men who died for it. It is a claim about why the doctrine developed on one side of the Adriatic and not the other, when both halves shared the same scripture and the same first seven councils. **The East never developed a theory of ecclesiastical supremacy over the state because the state was Christian, present, and paying**, and an institution does not construct a lever it has no use for.

A note on sources.

The battle of Civitate in June 1053, Leo IX's capture and confinement at Benevento, his release and death on 19 April 1054, are standard. That the legation of 1054 carried a commission to seek a military alliance against the Normans as well as to settle the ecclesiastical dispute is standard in the accounts of the mission.

Humbert of Silva Candida's background, his creation as cardinal in 1050, and his tract against the Greeks written before the embassy are standard. Constantine IX's desire for the alliance and his inability to compel Keroularios, and the popular support for the patriarch against the emperor, are as reported in the accounts.

The events of 16 July 1054, the cry *Videat Deus et judicet* and the shaking of the dust, and the legates' departure two days later, are treated in the Landscape with their sources.

The investiture of Robert Guiscard at Melfi in August 1059 as duke of Apulia and Calabria and prospective duke of Sicily, with his oath of fealty, is standard and is treated further in the Investiture Contest study in this sequence, as is the Norman relief and sack of Rome in 1084.

The proposition that a rupture becomes permanent when one party obtains from a third source what it had been seeking from the other, and the argument that a doctrine of ecclesiastical supremacy develops only where the institution lacks a state, are this study's.

MODULE 2

THREE OF THE FIVE WERE GONE

Module 2 · the settlement — a constitutional architecture designed for five poles, reduced by conquest to two, and the arithmetic that makes two the one number that cannot resolve a disagreement

The design

The eastern church's constitution had a name and a shape, and the shape is the module's subject.

The pentarchy — the government of the universal church by five patriarchal sees within a single Christian empire. It was formulated in Justinian's legislation, notably *Novella* 131, and given formal ecclesiastical sanction at the Council in Trullo in 692, which ranked the five as **Rome, Constantinople, Alexandria, Antioch and Jerusalem.**

Rome held the first place — a primacy of honour, of precedence, of the first word. What it did not hold, on this theory, was the power to define alone. **Doctrine was defined by councils of the whole church, convened by the emperor, at which the five sees were represented, and a definition made by one see acting by itself was not a definition.**

That is a genuinely different constitution from the one the western reform was building, and its properties are worth setting out in the terms this sequence uses.

It is redundant. No single addressee. A see that falls into heresy, or into the hands of unbelievers, or into vacancy, does not stop the church from functioning, because four others remain.

It is therefore unforkable in the sense the western schism of 1378 established. A disputed election at Constantinople is a disputed election at one of five sees; it does not stop provision, appeal or dispensation anywhere else, because there is no universal allocator whose desk is now empty.

And it is incapable of acting without its convener, which is the property that will destroy it, and which the module on the default will take up.

What conquest did to it

The architecture was designed for a world that ceased to exist within fifty years of the Council in Trullo.

Alexandria, Antioch and Jerusalem all fell to the Arab conquests of the seventh century. Their patriarchates continued to exist, and continue to exist, and their occupants remained real bishops with real flocks — but as functioning poles in a constitution of the universal church they were finished. They were outside the empire, under a non-Christian government, poor, and dependent. By the eleventh century they attended when the emperor arranged it and voted as he wished, and everybody on both sides knew it. When representatives of the three eastern patriarchates appeared at Ferrara-Florence in 1438, they were imperial appointees who appear to have had no contact with the sees they were purportedly representing.

So a five-node system was reduced by conquest to a two-node system, and it was never redesigned, because there was no procedure for redesigning it and no party with an interest in admitting what had happened.

Why two is the worst number

And now the arithmetic, which is the module's finding and which is simple enough to state in a sentence.

Three poles can resolve a disagreement between two of them. Five can. Two cannot.

A constitution of five sees contains, by construction, a mechanism for settling a dispute between any two: the other three. That mechanism is not a superior authority — no see judges another — but it is a *decision procedure*, and it works so long as at least three are functioning independently.

Reduce it to two and the procedure is gone. Rome and Constantinople disagreeing have nobody to appeal to, no majority to constitute, and no way to be outvoted. **The pentarchy's whole capacity to handle conflict lay in its plurality, and by the eleventh century the plurality was a fiction.**

That is the structural reason the eleventh-century quarrel could not be settled inside the eastern constitution, and it is entirely independent of the merits. It is also why the western answer — a single supreme see — looked to western eyes like the only workable arrangement: **from Rome, the pentarchy did not look like a constitution of five, because three of the five had not functioned in four hundred years.**

Two parties in a system designed for five will each read the system as confirming their own position: the one that holds first place reads it as primacy, and the one that holds the empire reads it as collegiality, and neither is misreading it, because a two-node version of a five-node design has no determinate meaning.

Who got what

The distribution question is short in this case because the two churches were not distributing to each other.

In the East, ecclesiastical property, appointments and revenues were inside the imperial system. The emperor endowed, confirmed, taxed and, when he needed to, confiscated. Bishops were appointed with imperial involvement and the patriarch of Constantinople was appointed by the emperor from a list. There was no flow of money out of the empire to any external ecclesiastical authority, because there was no external ecclesiastical authority.

In the West, the papacy was in the process of constructing exactly such a flow — the provisions, the appeals, the annates, the dispensations — and the fiscal apparatus examined in the western schism study is what it became.

The schism therefore cost neither side any revenue, because there was none crossing between them, which is one more reason nobody had a material incentive to end it.

The one place where jurisdiction was genuinely contested was southern Italy and the Balkans, where Latin and Greek populations lived under shifting political control and where both patriarchates claimed the same bishoprics. That dispute was real, was old, and was one of the immediate causes of 1052–54. It was also settled by the Normans, militarily, in favour of Rome.

Reading the settlement against the framework

The finding, and it is a proposition about constitutional design that this collection has not previously had a case for.

A polycentric constitution's capacity to resolve disputes is a function of the number of independently functioning centres, and it degrades catastrophically at the transition from three to two — because three is the smallest number that contains a decision procedure and two contains none.

That has a general application well beyond this case. Any arrangement designed to avoid a single point of failure by distributing authority among several nodes has a

minimum viable plurality, below which it retains the appearance of its design and loses the property the design existed to provide. And it will not notice the transition, because the fallen nodes remain nominally in place and can be got to attend when required.

The pentarchy did not fail in 1054. It failed in the seventh century, and 1054 is when somebody tried to use it.

And the second finding, on why each side found the other unintelligible. A two-node remnant of a five-node design supports both readings. Rome's primacy of honour, in a functioning pentarchy, is precedence among equals; in a two-node system it is the only asymmetry there is, and therefore reads as supremacy. Conciliar definition, in a functioning pentarchy, is a real procedure; in a two-node system it is a veto held by whichever party dissents.

Neither side was arguing in bad faith and neither was misreading the tradition. They were reading a constitution that no longer had a determinate meaning, and this study will find that condition again in the modules on formation and on the default.

A note on sources.

The pentarchy as formulated in Justinian's legislation, particularly *Novella* 131, its sanction at the Council in Trullo in 692, and its ranking of Rome, Constantinople, Alexandria, Antioch and Jerusalem are standard, as is the observation that it lost practical significance after the Muslim conquests of the seventh century removed three of the five from the empire.

That the representatives of Alexandria, Antioch and Jerusalem at Ferrara-Florence in 1438 were imperial appointees with no established connection to the sees they represented is reported in the scholarship and is contested in its details; it is used here only for the general point about the pentarchy's practical condition.

The imperial role in ecclesiastical appointment, endowment and taxation in the East, and the absence of any external ecclesiastical fiscal claim, are standard. The contested jurisdiction in southern Italy and the Balkans, and Keroularios's actions of 1052–53, are treated in the Landscape.

The proposition that a polycentric constitution has a minimum viable plurality of three, and that a two-node remnant supports both parties' readings without determining between them, is this study's.

MODULE 3

NOTHING CHANGED HANDS

Module 3 · the robe — two authorities that authorised nobody in common, an excommunication that transferred no title, and the reason a costless rupture is an unrepairable one

What an excommunication is worth

Take the events of July 1054 and ask the question this sequence asks of every legitimating act: **what did it transfer?**

Humbert's bull excommunicated Michael Keroularios and those who supported his folly. Keroularios's synod excommunicated the three legates. Neither document purported to excommunicate the other church, and neither did.

Now run through the parties and ask what any of them lost.

The Byzantine emperor. Constantine IX had wanted the alliance and was embarrassed by the outcome. He lost nothing else. His title came from acclamation by army, senate and people, from the diadem placed on him by his own patriarch, and from the seven-hundred-year continuity of a Roman state. **Nothing in that chain ran through Rome, and nothing in it had for centuries.** He was not crowned by the pope, invested by the pope, confirmed by the pope, or answerable to the pope.

The patriarch. Keroularios was appointed by an emperor and could be deposed by one — as he in fact was, in 1058, by Isaac Komnenos, four years after the affair with the legates and for reasons that had nothing to do with them. His position did not derive from Rome and Rome could not touch it.

The pope. By 1054 the papal election was a matter for the Roman clergy and, from 1059, formally for the cardinals. Byzantine confirmation of papal elections had existed in the seventh and eighth centuries and had lapsed with the Carolingian settlement. **No pope after 800 needed anything from Constantinople to be pope.**

The western emperor. Made by a pope, at Rome, and regarded by Constantinople as a usurper — a position Constantinople had held since 800 and which the schism did not alter by a syllable.

The bishops, priests and laity of either half. Their orders were unaffected; each side continued to recognise the other's sacraments as valid, and does to this day.

Nobody's marriage was voided, nobody's benefice was contested, nobody's appeal failed.

Nothing changed hands.

The contrast that makes the point

Set that beside the western schism examined in the preceding study and the difference is total.

In 1378 two men claimed the same office within a single authorising structure. **Every benefice in Latin Europe, every appeal, every dispensation, every episcopal appointment ran through that office**, and with two occupants none of them could be securely done. The instrument was destroyed instantly, and the destruction cost the church thirty-nine years, two curias, a third claimant, and a repair that required an emperor's force and a claimant's convocation.

In 1054 two authorities who authorised nothing for each other stopped being in communion. Provisions continued. Appeals continued. Emperors were crowned in both halves. Priests said mass. **The instruments on both sides went on working exactly as before, because they had never been connected.**

The value of a rupture's damage is the value of the authorisations that crossed it, and across this line the value was zero.

Why costlessness is fatal

And now the finding, which is the answer to the question this case was taken up to test.

A rupture that costs nothing generates no urgency, and a rupture that generates no urgency is never repaired.

That is not a paradox. It is the ordinary logic of repair. The western schism was fixed in thirty-nine years because it was intolerable — every prelate in Europe had a benefice at risk, every crown had appointments in dispute, and the pressure built continuously until an emperor and a claimant were found who would end it. **The pressure was the mechanism.**

The eastern rupture produced no comparable pressure at any point in the following four centuries. Nobody's income depended on healing it. Nobody's title was insecure without it. The churches functioned; the states functioned; the sacraments were valid on both sides; and the two halves drifted, at leisure, for four hundred years.

A costly schism contains its own repair mechanism. A costless one contains nothing, and will last until something else makes it expensive — which in this case

was the Turkish advance, and by then the terms available were terms of submission.

That is the whole shape of the case, and every subsequent module is a working-out of it.

What each side's robe actually said

The doctrinal positions should be stated fairly because both are coherent and each is the natural output of its own settlement.

The Roman position: the bishop of Rome is Peter's successor; Christ's commission to Peter was personal and transmissible; the Roman see has therefore a primacy of jurisdiction and not merely of honour; it is the court of final appeal for the whole church; and a council's decrees require its confirmation.

The Constantinopolitan position: the church is governed by the consensus of the patriarchal sees; Rome holds the first place of honour among equals; doctrine is defined by ecumenical councils and by nothing else; no see may alter a conciliar creed unilaterally; and the emperor, as the Christian ruler of the *oikoumene*, convenes the councils that decide.

Each is the doctrine an institution in that position would produce. The Roman position is the doctrine of an authority with no state, whose only lever is supremacy. The Constantinopolitan position is the doctrine of an authority inside a Christian empire that has never needed a lever, in a constitution designed for five poles.

Neither could concede without destroying its own settlement, and that — rather than the filioque, the azymes or the beards — is why the argument had no available resolution.

Reading the robe against the framework

The finding. The value of an authorisation is a property of its issuer; the damage done by a schism is the value of the authorisations that crossed the line it opened.

Where two authorities authorise nothing for each other, their rupture is a jurisdictional divorce and not a legitimacy crisis — it transfers no title, vacates no office, and imposes no cost. And because it imposes no cost, it generates no repair, which means **a costless schism is a permanent one.**

State the general form: **the durability of a schism is inversely proportional to its cost.** The western schism cost everything and lasted thirty-nine years. The eastern schism cost nothing and has lasted nine hundred and seventy. That is not a coincidence and it is not a moral fact about either party's obstinacy; it is arithmetic about who had a

reason to move.

And the second finding, on why the two doctrines were irreconcilable. Each side's ecclesiology is the natural product of its own military and fiscal position. An institution without a state develops supremacy because supremacy is its only instrument; an institution inside a Christian state develops collegiality because it has no need of an instrument at all.

Doctrinal positions that are each the natural output of a different material position cannot be reconciled by argument, because the argument is not what produced them — which is why nine centuries of learned exchange has moved the question very little, and why the two occasions on which union was agreed were both moments when one side's material position had collapsed.

A note on sources.

The personal and limited character of the 1054 excommunications is treated in the Landscape with its sources. The deposition of Keroularios by Isaac Komnenos in 1058 is standard.

The Byzantine imperial accession — acclamation by army, senate and people, and coronation by the patriarch — is standard, as is the lapse of Byzantine confirmation of papal elections after the Carolingian settlement and the papal election decree of 1059, treated in the Investiture Contest study in this sequence.

That both churches have continued to recognise the validity of each other's sacraments and orders is standard.

The statements of the Roman and Constantinopolitan positions given here are summaries of the standard accounts of each and are not quotations; no primary text is cited for either, and the study does not adjudicate between them.

The propositions that the damage done by a schism equals the value of the authorisations crossing the line, that a costless schism is a permanent one, and that doctrinal positions produced by differing material positions are not reconcilable by argument, are this study's.

MODULE 4

NEITHER COULD READ THE OTHER

Module 4 · formation — two halves of one church that stopped sharing a language, then stopped sharing a genre, and finally stopped being able to conduct the argument at all

The language

The most consequential fact about the eleventh-century relation between Rome and Constantinople is one that appears in no theological treatise.

By 1054 educated westerners could not read Greek and educated easterners could not read Latin.

The bilingualism of the late antique Mediterranean had decayed on both sides over four centuries. In the West the collapse of Greek learning was near total outside a handful of centres; in the East, Latin — which had been the language of the Roman state and of Justinian's own legislation — had become a foreign tongue studied by specialists.

The consequences run through everything.

The filioque dispute is partly a translation failure. The Greek creed says the Spirit *ekporeuetai* from the Father — a verb carrying a sense of origination from an ultimate source. The Latin renders it *procedit*, which is broader and does not carry that sense. A Latin theologian saying the Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son is asserting something a Greek theologian, reading his own verb, hears as the claim that the Spirit has two ultimate origins — which is a heresy. **Two churches were anathematising each other over a proposition that did not mean the same thing in the two languages, and neither could check.**

And the polemics were increasingly written without reading the opponent. Humbert's bull of 1054 accuses the Greeks of having *removed* the filioque from the creed, which is exactly backwards: the clause was a western addition and Rome itself had resisted it for two hundred years. That is not a debating trick; it is a man who does not know the history of the text he is defending.

Where two parties to a dispute cannot read each other's documents, the dispute will proceed by caricature and will worsen at a rate set by the volume of writing rather than by the depth of disagreement.

Two formations

Beneath the language a deeper divergence was running, and it concerns how each half made its clergy.

Both halves used the **same credential**: ordination by a bishop, in an unbroken chain, institutionally conferred. That is worth stating because it means the two churches always recognised each other's orders, and still do, and the schism has therefore never produced the sacramental crisis that a credential dispute would have caused.

But the **formation** around that credential diverged completely.

The West built cathedral schools, then universities. Its theology became a discipline organised around the reconciliation of authorities — the technique the Investiture Contest generated, as that study established, when a party without an army had to argue from texts. From that came canon law as a systematic science, scholasticism, the *quaestio*, and a clerical class trained to state a position, marshal objections and resolve them.

The East kept its theological formation where it had always been: in the monasteries, in the liturgy, and in a patristic tradition transmitted by commentary rather than by disputation. Its great intellectual achievements of the period are liturgical, ascetic and mystical — the tradition that would produce the hesychast controversy of the fourteenth century and Gregory Palamas.

Neither is inferior. **They are different genres**, and by the twelfth century the two halves were producing kinds of writing that the other side found not merely wrong but unrecognisable as theology. A Latin scholastic reading a Byzantine spiritual treatise sees no argument; a Byzantine reading a scholastic *summa* sees the mysteries of God treated as a legal problem.

A dispute between parties who no longer share a genre cannot be conducted, because they cannot agree on what would count as an answer.

What formed the laity

And on both sides, beneath the clergy, the formation of ordinary Christians continued exactly as it always had — and this is the fact that makes the schism both invisible and irreversible.

A peasant in Anatolia and a peasant in Aquitaine were each formed in infancy by a parish, a liturgy, a calendar, and a set of saints. **Neither's formation contained anything about the other**, because the other was six weeks away and had never mattered to a single decision either would make.

That is why the schism produced no popular crisis in 1054: nothing in ordinary religious life referred to the other half. And it is why the unions of 1274 and 1439 failed: **an agreement signed by an apex over a population whose formation contains no place for it will not hold**, because the population has no reason to accept it and every element of its own formation says otherwise.

The Greek population's formation, by the fourteenth century, contained a great deal about the Latins — and none of it good, because of what had happened in 1204.

Reading formation against the framework

The first finding, and it is a mechanism this collection has not needed before. The two halves shared a credential and diverged in formation, and the divergence did the work.

A shared credential preserves mutual recognition; a shared formation preserves mutual intelligibility; and the second can be lost while the first is kept. Rome and Constantinople never stopped recognising each other's priests and never stopped being able to argue with each other — they stopped being able to argue *productively*, because they had ceased to hold in common the training, the language and the genre that make an argument decidable.

That is worth carrying as a distinct failure mode, because it is slow, invisible, and produces no crisis at the moment it occurs. **Two institutions can drift into mutual unintelligibility while every formal link between them remains intact**, and neither will notice until they have to settle something.

The second finding, on translation. The single most cited doctrinal cause of the schism turns partly on a verb.

Where a common creed exists in two languages and the languages are no longer both read, the creed has silently become two creeds, and the parties will discover this only when they attempt to enforce it against each other. That is a general hazard of any tradition transmitted in translation and it has no remedy short of maintained

bilingualism, which is expensive and is exactly the thing that gets cut when contact declines.

And the third, on unions imposed from above. Both attempted reunions were agreed by emperors and hierarchs and repudiated by populations. This sequence has met the mechanism twice already — the laity that Latin reform taught to judge its priests, and the Islamic *'ulamā'* whose personal licence made them uncommittable.

A formation the apex did not build is a formation the apex cannot renegotiate, and an agreement about doctrine made over the heads of the people whose belief it concerns will be refused by them whatever the hierarchy signs.

A note on sources.

The decay of Greek in the medieval West and of Latin in the medieval East is standard. The distinction between the Greek verb used in the creed and the Latin *procedere*, and its bearing on the filioque dispute, is standard in the modern scholarship on the question, principally A. E. Siecienski's; the argument is reported here in outline and no Greek or Latin text is quoted.

That Humbert's bull accused the Greeks of deleting the filioque from the creed is reported in the accounts of the document and is treated in the Landscape.

The mutual recognition of orders between the two churches, then and since, is standard. The development of cathedral schools, universities, canon law and scholasticism in the West is treated in the Investiture Contest study in this sequence. The monastic and liturgical character of Byzantine theological formation, and the hesychast controversy of the fourteenth century associated with Gregory Palamas, are standard; the latter is not examined here.

The failure of the unions of Lyon (1274) and Ferrara-Florence (1439) through popular and monastic repudiation is treated in Modules 9 and 10 with their sources.

The distinction between a shared credential and a shared formation, and the proposition that mutual unintelligibility can develop while formal links remain intact, are this study's.

MODULE 5

WHAT IT COST TO STAY APART

Module 5 · the cost column — a rupture with no running expenses, four centuries of cheap divergence, and the single invoice that arrived in 1453

The running cost

Price the schism year by year and for most of its length the figure is close to zero.

No duplicated administration. Unlike 1378, there were not two curias claiming the same obedience. There was a papal administration governing the Latin west and a patriarchal administration governing the Greek east, and each had governed its own territory before the rupture and continued to govern it afterwards, with the same staff and the same revenues.

No contested benefices. No appeal from a Greek diocese ever went to Rome and none was expected to. No papal provision was ever made to a see in Anatolia. The two systems of allocation did not overlap, so there was nothing to duplicate.

No war between the two churches. There were wars between the Normans and Byzantium, between the crusader states and Byzantium, and eventually the catastrophe of 1204 — but none of them was a war of Rome against Constantinople, and none was fought to settle the ecclesiastical question.

No suppression campaign. Neither side had jurisdiction in the other's territory and neither attempted to acquire it, with the exception of the Latin patriarchate established after 1204 and the Latin bishoprics in territories the crusaders took, which is a real cost and a localised one.

And no cost to the ordinary Christian on either side, whose religion referred to the other half not at all.

That is a rupture with essentially no running expenses, and it ran for four hundred years.

The one continuous cost

There was an exception and it should be named, because it is where the schism was continuously expensive to somebody.

The contested zones. Southern Italy, where Greek-rite and Latin-rite populations lived under Norman rule after the 1050s; the Balkans, where Bulgarian and Serbian churches were claimed by both; the crusader states after 1099, where Latin patriarchs were installed at Antioch and Jerusalem alongside Greek incumbents; and after 1204 the Latin empire of Constantinople with a Latin patriarch in Hagia Sophia.

In every one of those places the schism was not an abstraction. It determined whose bishop you had, whose rite you followed, whose courts heard your marriage case, and in several periods whether you were subject to disabilities.

The cost of the schism fell almost entirely on the populations at the seam, and the seam was a narrow strip. Everyone away from it paid nothing.

That is a general shape worth naming. **Where two authorities divide territorially rather than competing for the same territory, the cost of their division is borne by the border**, and its magnitude is a function of how long the border is rather than how deep the disagreement runs.

What the East spent instead

Meanwhile the eastern church's actual expenditure went where it had always gone, and the schism did not alter it.

The Byzantine church was funded by imperial endowment, by its own estates, and by the offerings of the faithful. It paid nothing to any external authority. Its great expense was monasticism, which grew steadily and which acquired, by the later empire, an enormous share of the land — with the consequence that emperors from the tenth century onward legislated repeatedly and unsuccessfully against monastic accumulation.

The East had the fiscal problem of a church inside a state: an exempt sector growing at the expense of the taxable one, and a government unable to stop it. That is the Mongol-Yuan problem examined in the Sakya study, and it has nothing to do with the schism, and it contributed materially to the empire's decline.

The West had the opposite fiscal problem: a church outside every state, extracting from all of them, generating the grievance that the western schism study traced forward to the sixteenth century.

Neither problem was caused by the division and neither could have been solved by ending it.

The invoice

And then, once, the schism was catastrophically expensive, and the bill was presented to one party only.

From the later thirteenth century the eastern empire was dying. It lost Anatolia to the Turks, was reduced to Constantinople and fragments of Greece, and by the fifteenth century was a city-state paying tribute. Its only possible salvation was a western military expedition, and the price of a western military expedition was ecclesiastical submission.

So the East had to buy an army with a doctrine, which is the transaction this whole sequence has been examining, running in a direction none of the earlier cases displayed.

Michael VIII Palaiologos accepted union at Lyon in 1274 to forestall a Norman-Angevin invasion. It was repudiated at home and he was denied burial rites.

John VIII Palaiologos went to Ferrara and Florence in 1438–39 with over seven hundred people, including the patriarch and the nominal representatives of the three fallen sees, and signed. **The aid did not come in any adequate form.** The crusade that did come was destroyed at Varna in 1444. The city fell on 29 May 1453.

The whole cost of the schism, four centuries of it, was paid by the eastern empire in the fifteenth century, all at once, and what it bought was nothing.

Reading the cost column against the framework

The first finding, and it completes the argument of Module 3. A schism between authorities who authorise nothing for each other has no running cost, and therefore no party ever has a marginal reason to end it.

But a costless division accumulates an option liability, and the liability falls due when one of the parties needs something from the other. For four hundred years neither did. When the East finally did — an army, urgently, against the Turks — it discovered that it was negotiating from a position in which its entire remaining asset was its ecclesiastical independence, and that the price was that asset.

A division that costs nothing to maintain is a division whose entire cost is deferred to whichever party first needs help, and the deferral makes the eventual terms far worse than they would have been at any earlier date. Union in 1100 would have been a negotiation between an empire and a bishop. Union in 1439 was a submission by a dying state.

The second finding, on where a territorial schism's costs fall. They fell on the seam — southern Italy, the Balkans, the crusader states, Latin Constantinople — and not on either interior. That is the opposite of the western schism of 1378, whose costs fell everywhere because the two obediences competed for the same territory.

A schism that divides territory imposes its costs on the border; a schism that divides an authority imposes them on everybody — and the first will therefore be tolerated indefinitely by populations who never see it, which is one more reason this one lasted.

A note on sources.

The absence of duplicated administration, contested benefices and inter-church warfare between Rome and Constantinople during the schism is a description of the structural position and is not disputed. The Latin patriarchates at Antioch and Jerusalem established during the crusades, and the Latin patriarchate of Constantinople after 1204, are standard and are treated further in Module 10.

The funding of the Byzantine church by imperial endowment and its own estates, and the imperial legislation from the tenth century against monastic accumulation of land, are standard; no figures are given for the extent of monastic holdings, as the estimates vary widely.

Michael VIII Palaiologos's acceptance of union at the Second Council of Lyon in 1274, its domestic repudiation and his denial of burial rites, are standard. The Byzantine delegation to Ferrara-Florence in 1438 of over seven hundred, including the emperor John VIII, the patriarch and representatives of the three eastern patriarchates, the signing of union in 1439, the crusade destroyed at Varna in 1444, and the fall of Constantinople on 29 May 1453, are standard.

The proposition that a costless division accumulates an option liability falling due when one party first needs help, and the observation that a territorial schism imposes its costs on the border, are this study's.

MODULE 6

THE EMPEROR PAID FOR IT

Module 6 · extraction — a church inside a treasury and a church outside every treasury, and why only one of them ever needed to invent an indulgence

Two positions

The fiscal difference between the two halves is not a detail of administration. It is the difference that generated most of what each became.

The eastern church was inside the state. Its property was granted by emperors and taxed, exempted or resumed by emperors. Its senior appointments were made with imperial involvement. Its councils were convened and their decrees promulgated as imperial law. Its patriarch lived in the capital, a few hundred yards from the palace, and was appointed from a list the emperor approved.

It therefore never needed to raise revenue from an external population, because the population and the state were the same and the state was Christian.

The western church was outside every state. After the Gregorian reform it claimed jurisdiction over clergy in every kingdom of Latin Europe, appointment to benefices in all of them, and appellate authority from all of them — and it had to fund that claim from those same kingdoms, against the resistance of their rulers, with no state of its own beyond the papal territories.

It therefore built the instruments examined in the western schism study: annates, common services, spoils, reservations, and eventually the indulgence.

Both of those are the natural output of a position, and neither could have been adopted by the other side.

What each system produced

Follow each forward and the divergence is complete.

The eastern system produced dependence. A church funded by an emperor is a church that cannot easily oppose an emperor, and the record shows exactly that: patriarchs deposed for opposing imperial policy, councils convened to ratify imperial theology, and — twice — imperial signatures on unions the church did not want.

When the state died in 1453 the church survived, but it survived by acquiring a new state: the Ottoman sultan made the patriarch the civil head of the Orthodox *millet*, responsible for the community's taxes and conduct, and appointed and deposed patriarchs at a rate that would have embarrassed a Byzantine emperor.

The western system produced independence and a grievance. A church funded by extraction from kingdoms it does not govern is a church that can defy kings, and it did. It is also a church whose revenue instruments are visible to everybody who pays them, resented, and available to be denounced — and the denunciation, when it came, took the form of an argument about a fiscal instrument.

The instrument the East never invented

Which produces the observation this module exists to make.

There is no eastern indulgence controversy, and there could not have been, because the eastern church had no reason to invent an indulgence.

An indulgence, in the form that became the sixteenth century's scandal, is a spiritual instrument monetised for a fiscal purpose by an institution that needs money from populations it does not tax directly. The eastern church was funded by a state. It had no building programme to finance out of Christendom at large, no curia to maintain from foreign benefices, no collectors in kingdoms it did not govern.

An institution invents the fiscal instruments its position requires, and the eastern position required none of the ones the West became notorious for.

That is not a claim of eastern virtue and should not be read as one. The eastern church had its own corruptions, principally the sale of ecclesiastical offices under the later empire and under the Ottomans, where the patriarchate itself was effectively purchased at intervals. **The difference is not integrity. It is that each side's characteristic vice is the vice of its funding structure**, and the two funding structures were opposite.

Who paid, in each half

In the East, the peasantry of the empire paid taxes to the state, and the state endowed the church; and the peasantry on monastic estates paid rents to the monasteries, which were largely exempt. The exempt share grew steadily and the emperors could not reverse it. **The eastern church's fiscal problem was that its own success removed land from the state's tax base**, which is the same problem the Yuan encountered with Buddhist exemption and which the Sakya study examined.

In the West, the same peasantry paid the same rents, and a share of them was extracted upward through annates and services to a court in Italy that no king controlled.

The cultivator's position was identical in both halves and the destination of his surplus was different, which is the shape this collection finds in almost every case and finds here with unusual clarity, because the two halves are a controlled comparison: same religion, same agricultural technology, same class structure, and two entirely different arrangements above his head that made no difference whatever to him.

Reading extraction against the framework

The finding, and it is a proposition about institutions generally.

An institution's characteristic fiscal instruments are determined by its position relative to states, and its characteristic scandals follow from its instruments. A church inside a state does not invent transnational taxation and does not produce a Reformation about indulgences; it produces dependence and, in the end, a patriarch appointed by a sultan. A church outside all states invents transnational taxation, produces independence, and produces a grievance that eventually detonates.

Neither outcome is a moral fact about the men involved. Both are what the position generates, and the two halves of one church, sharing a scripture, a creed and a set of orders, generated opposite fiscal cultures within three centuries of ceasing to be in communion — which is about as clean a demonstration of position logic as this collection is likely to find.

And the second finding, on why the comparison is worth making. This case is the nearest thing the collection has to a controlled experiment. One religion, one origin, one body of scripture and law, divided in two, running for a millennium under different constitutional and fiscal arrangements.

Where a single tradition divides and the halves run separately for centuries, the divergence between them measures the causal weight of position rather than of doctrine — because doctrine was held in common at the start and position was not. On that measure the weight of position is very large: the two halves diverged in fiscal instruments, in the relation of church to state, in the training of clergy, in the genre of theology and in the location of counterweights, while continuing to recognise each other's sacraments throughout.

A note on sources.

The imperial funding, appointment and legislative supervision of the Byzantine church, and the position of the patriarch in the capital, are treated in the Landscape with their sources. The imperial legislation against monastic accumulation is treated in Module 5.

The Ottoman *millet* arrangement, under which the patriarch of Constantinople became the civil head of the Orthodox community with responsibility for its taxation and conduct, and the frequent appointment and deposition of patriarchs by the sultans together with the effective purchase of the office, are standard and are treated further in Module 10.

The western fiscal instruments — annates, common services, spoils, reservations and indulgences — are documented in the western schism study in this sequence.

The comparison with Buddhist tax exemption under the Yuan draws on the Sakya study in this sequence.

The proposition that an institution's characteristic scandals follow from its funding position, and the argument that the two halves constitute a controlled comparison measuring the causal weight of position against doctrine, are this study's.

MODULE 7

THE SCHISM WAS DATED AFTERWARDS

Module 7 · information and suppression — a rupture nobody recorded as a rupture, a date assigned centuries later, and the difficulty of studying a division that had no moment

The event that was not one

The most striking documentary fact about this case is what the eleventh-century sources do not say.

They do not say that the church divided in 1054. **They say that a legate quarrelled with a patriarch.**

The Byzantine chroniclers treat the affair as an episode in the reign of Constantine IX, and one about which the emperor was embarrassed. The western sources treat it as a failed embassy. Neither side's canonists cite it as the moment communion ceased. Neither side stopped recognising the other's orders. The three legates went home; one of them, Frederick of Lorraine, became pope himself four years later as Stephen IX and is not recorded as regarding the matter as settled or as final.

The date 1054 was made into a schism by historians, centuries afterwards, working backwards from a division they knew existed and looking for a beginning.

That is unusual and it produces a specific difficulty for a study of this kind. **The framework's normal method is to find the moment of settlement and read the document. There is no document and there was no moment.**

Where the division actually is

So the study has to locate the division by other means, and the honest answer is that it is distributed across four centuries and can be dated four different ways depending on what one takes the schism to consist of.

If the schism is a constitutional divergence — two incompatible answers to who authorises whom — it dates from **800**, when a pope crowned a rival Roman emperor,

and was complete before any theologian wrote a word about the filioque.

If it is a formal rupture of communion between the sees — 1054, with the qualifications this study has made.

If it is the moment the two populations became enemies — 1204, when a crusading army sacked Constantinople and installed a Latin patriarch in Hagia Sophia.

If it is the moment reunion became finally impossible — either **1439–53**, when a union was signed under duress, repudiated at home, and rendered irrelevant by conquest; or the long Ottoman centuries in which the eastern church's survival came to depend on not being Latin.

A division without a moment is a division that must be dated by what one thinks divisions are made of, and this study's answer, on the framework's own terms, is 800 for the cause and 1204 for the completion, with 1054 as an incident that was later promoted.

What each side knew about the other

The information position between the two halves deteriorated steadily and the deterioration is measurable in the polemics.

The early exchanges — Photios in the ninth century, the disputations of the eleventh — are conducted by men who have read the other tradition. Photios knew Latin sources. Humbert did not know Greek ones, as his error about the filioque's origin demonstrates.

By the twelfth and thirteenth centuries the standard western view of the Greeks and the standard Greek view of the Latins were both composed largely of atrocity, ritual difference and caricature, and each was maintained by writers who had not read the other side and did not expect to.

Where contact declines, each side's account of the other is written from its own tradition's earlier accounts, which produces divergence at a compounding rate — because every generation's caricature is drawn from the last one's rather than from the thing.

And there is a documentary consequence for this study. Unlike the western schism, where two complete curial archives survive and agree about the facts, **here the two archives are largely uninterested in each other.** Byzantine sources are thin on western ecclesiastical developments; western sources are thin on eastern ones. The historian is not weighing two accounts of one event; he is reading two traditions that had stopped attending.

What was suppressed

Very little, and where it happened it was territorial.

Neither side could suppress the other, because neither had jurisdiction in the other's territory. What each did was suppress the other's rite **where it held the ground.**

In the West and in Norman Italy: Greek-rite communities were progressively brought under Latin bishops. In the crusader states, Latin patriarchs were installed at Antioch and Jerusalem over existing Greek incumbents.

After 1204: a Latin emperor in Constantinople, a Latin patriarch in Hagia Sophia, Latin bishops across the Greek territories the crusaders held, and the Greek hierarchy in exile at Nicaea.

And in the East, correspondingly, the Latin communities of Constantinople were closed by Keroularios in 1052–53, and after 1261 the restored Byzantine authorities reversed the Latin ecclesiastical settlement where they could.

Suppression in a territorial schism is a function of who holds the ground, and it changes when the ground changes — which is a different mechanism from the doctrinal policing this collection has met elsewhere, and it produces its own signature: the same population being re-organised ecclesiastically two or three times in a century according to the fortunes of war.

Reading the seam against the framework

The first finding, and it is methodological. This sequence's characteristic instrument is to set a public claim beside a private fact and read the gap. That instrument requires an event. This case has none.

A division produced by drift rather than by an act leaves no document, and its date is therefore a historiographical choice rather than a finding. The correct response is to say so, to specify what one is dating, and to give the alternatives — which this module has done — rather than to accept a conventional date whose function is to make a process narratable.

The corollary is worth carrying because it applies widely: where a familiar historical rupture has a famous date and a dramatic scene attached to it, check whether contemporaries treated it as a rupture. Here they did not, and the scene in Hagia Sophia was promoted to a turning point by people who needed one.

And the second finding, on how estrangement compounds. The two halves' accounts of each other degraded not because either was lying but because contact fell below the level at which either could check. Each generation wrote from the previous generation's account.

Mutual understanding between two institutions is a maintained condition, not a stable one, and when the maintenance stops the divergence accelerates rather than settling — because the material each side is working from is itself the product of the drift. That is the same mechanism the module on formation identified in the language, arriving at the level of political knowledge rather than of vocabulary.

A note on sources.

The treatment of the events of 1054 in the eleventh-century sources, and the fact that neither side's canonists cited them as terminating communion, is the current historiographical position and is treated in the Landscape. Frederick of Lorraine's accession as Stephen IX in 1057 is standard.

The construction of 1054 as the date of the schism by later historiography, and its rejection by modern scholarship, is standard and is stated in the Landscape.

Photios's knowledge of Latin sources and Humbert's error concerning the origin of the filioque are treated in Module 4 with their sources.

The Latin patriarchates at Antioch and Jerusalem, the Latin ecclesiastical settlement after 1204 and its partial reversal after 1261, and Keroularios's closure of the Latin churches in 1052–53, are standard and are treated further in Module 10.

The proposition that a division produced by drift is dated by historiographical choice rather than by evidence, and the argument that mutual understanding between institutions is a maintained rather than a stable condition, are this study's.

MODULE 8

THE EMPEROR CONVENED THEM

Module 8 · elite coordination and the default — how the East solved the problem that destroyed the West in 1378, what it cost to solve it that way, and the council that has not met since 787

The problem, and the two answers

Every institution that decides doctrine collectively faces one question before it can decide anything: **who convenes?**

The western schism study established what happens when there is no answer. A general council is convoked by the pope; if convoked by one of two claimants it presupposes the answer; if it convokes itself it is a self-constituted body with the same defect as a self-authorising ruler. Pisa in 1409 tried the third option and produced a third pope. Constance succeeded only by importing an emperor with the force to convene and a claimant willing to convoke the body that would remove him.

The East never had that problem, because it had a standing convener outside the church.

The ecumenical councils were called by emperors. Constantine called Nicaea in 325. Theodosius called Constantinople in 381. Marcian called Chalcedon in 451. Justinian called Constantinople II in 553. Constantine IV called Constantinople III. Irene and Constantine VI called Nicaea II in 787. Basil I called the council of 879–880 that the East counts as the eighth.

An emperor is not a party to a doctrinal dispute between bishops. He has force, he has the standing of a Christian sovereign, he can compel attendance, he can enforce a result, and — crucially — **he is not competing for the office in dispute.**

That is precisely the party Constance had to import in the person of Sigismund, and precisely the party Pisa lacked. The East had one permanently, by constitution, and used it routinely.

What that bought

The consequences run through the whole eastern record and every one of them is the inverse of a western pathology.

No investiture contest. The question of who appoints bishops was never in dispute, because the answer was settled and nobody had a doctrine with which to contest it. The West fought fifty years over it.

No conciliar crisis. The question of who convenes a council was never in dispute either, for the same reason.

No papal monarchy, and therefore no single addressee to fork. The eastern church could not have had a schism of the 1378 kind, because it had no office through which every provision, appeal and dispensation ran.

And a working procedure for deposing a patriarch: the emperor did it, and it was accepted. Ignatios, Photios, Keroularios, and many others were made and unmade without producing a constitutional crisis, because there was a constitution and it said the emperor could.

The East solved the coordination problem completely and did so by locating the convening power in a political office outside the church.

What it cost

And here is the module's finding, and it is the exact counterpart of the western one.

An institution that locates its convening power in a political office has made its capacity to decide contingent on that office's survival.

The last council the Orthodox churches universally recognise as ecumenical is **Nicaea II, in 787.** On a wider reckoning the council of 879–880 is counted as the eighth. Either way, the number of ecumenical councils held after the fall of the empire that convened them is **zero**, and it is zero for a structural reason rather than from lack of matters requiring decision.

There have been matters requiring decision. The hesychast controversy of the fourteenth century was settled by local councils at Constantinople under imperial authority — the last period in which the mechanism still worked. After 1453 there was no emperor, and there has been no body since with the standing to convene the whole church.

The attempt to hold one in the twentieth century — the Holy and Great Council eventually convened in Crete in 2016 — was preceded by decades of preparation and was boycotted by four of the fourteen autocephalous churches, which is exactly what a

system with no convener produces.

The West located its convening power inside the church, at a single desk, and forked catastrophically in 1378. The East located it outside the church, in an emperor, and after 1453 could not convene at all.

Those are the two available failures and they are the two faces of one choice. **A convener inside the institution can be disputed; a convener outside it can die.**

The default

Which yields the default state of the eastern order after the empire ended, and it is not disorder.

It is autocephaly. The eastern church survived as a family of self-governing churches — Constantinople, Antioch, Alexandria, Jerusalem, and in time Russia, Serbia, Bulgaria, Romania, Greece and others — each administering itself, each in communion with the rest, none subordinate to any, and none able to bind the others.

That is an extraordinarily robust arrangement and an extraordinarily undecisive one. It cannot fork, because there is no single office to contest. It cannot be captured wholesale, because there is no apex to seize. It survived the Ottoman centuries, the Russian synodal period, and the twentieth century's persecutions, and it is still there.

And it cannot resolve a dispute between two of its members, which is the pentarchy's arithmetic from Module 2 arriving at full scale: **a system of many equal poles with no convener has redundancy without a decision procedure**, and in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries the consequence has been visible in disputes over jurisdiction that have no mechanism for settlement.

Reading the default against the framework

The finding, and it completes an argument this sequence began two studies ago.

The western schism study established that a broken source of title is repaired by an outside enforcer plus an inside donor, and that a self-constituted body cannot do it. **This case shows the same requirement met permanently and structurally rather than improvised in an emergency** — the eastern church had its outside enforcer built into the constitution, and consequently never needed the improvisation.

Which produces the general statement: an institution that decides collectively must locate its convening power either inside itself, where it can be disputed and forked, or outside itself, where it can be lost — and there is no third option,

because a body cannot convene itself without becoming a self-constituted authority, which is the one thing an authority cannot be.

The two halves of one church took the two available options and each suffered the corresponding failure. That is as close to a controlled demonstration of a structural proposition as this collection has produced.

And the second finding, on the price of robustness. The eastern arrangement after 1453 is the most durable ecclesiastical structure examined in this sequence. It has survived five centuries of Muslim rule, two of Russian state control, and one of atheist persecution, and it is intact.

It achieved that durability by giving up the capacity to decide. A body that cannot be captured because there is nothing to capture is also a body that cannot act, and the same property produces both.

That is the fourth time this sequence has arrived at the proposition and it should now be stated as settled: **reach, capturability, forkability and corporate decisiveness are faces of one property, and no institution chooses among them separately.** The Islamic *'ulamā'* found it with a personal credential. The Latin church found it with an institutional one. The eastern church found it by losing its convener. All three arrive at the same trade.

A note on sources.

The imperial convocation of the ecumenical councils — Constantine at Nicaea in 325, Theodosius at Constantinople in 381, Marcian at Chalcedon in 451, Justinian in 553, Constantine IV, and Irene and Constantine VI at Nicaea II in 787 — is standard, as is Basil I's convocation of the council of 879–880 which Eastern Orthodoxy counts as ecumenical in some reckonings.

That Eastern Orthodoxy has held no council universally recognised as ecumenical since 787, on the stricter reckoning, is standard. The councils of Constantinople in the fourteenth century settling the hesychast controversy, held under imperial authority, are standard and are referred to only for the point about mechanism.

The Holy and Great Council of Crete in 2016, its long preparation and the non-attendance of four autocephalous churches, is standard and is stated as reported; the study takes no position on its status.

The imperial deposition and appointment of patriarchs, including Ignatios, Photios and Keroularios, is treated in the Landscape and Module 3 with their sources. The Ottoman *millet* arrangement is treated in Modules 6 and 10.

The comparison with Pisa and Constance draws on the western schism study in this sequence, where the material is documented.

The proposition that a collective decision-making institution must locate its convening power inside itself, where it can be forked, or outside itself, where it can be lost, with no third option, is this study's, and it completes an argument begun in the preceding study.

MODULE 9

THE MONKS SAID NO

Module 9 · plurality or foreclosure — an emperor who could depose a patriarch and could not move a population, two unions signed at the top and refused at the bottom, and the one counterweight the East possessed

What the emperor could not do

The Landscape established that the eastern emperor appointed and deposed patriarchs, convened councils and legislated for the church. That is a formidable position and it has a boundary, and the boundary is where this module lives.

He could not change what the population believed, and twice he tried and failed.

The demonstration comes earliest in the iconoclast controversy of the eighth and ninth centuries. A succession of emperors, backed by armies and by a substantial part of the episcopate, attempted for over a century to remove images from Christian worship. They had the state, the appointments and the councils. They were defeated — by monks, by popular devotion, and eventually by an empress who reversed the policy and by another who reversed it again for good in 843, a day still kept in the Orthodox calendar as the Triumph of Orthodoxy.

The monasteries were the instrument of that defeat, and they remained the eastern church's standing counterweight thereafter. Stoudios in the capital; later the Holy Mountain of Athos, whose foundations date from the tenth century and whose houses were granted imperial charters of self-government.

A monk holds nothing the emperor gave him and wants nothing the emperor can give. He has no benefice to lose, no family to advance, no career, and — this is the operative point — an audience that regards his lack of interest as the guarantee of his testimony. That is precisely the profile this sequence identified in the Joan study: **the qualification of an author of title is incapacity to profit**, and a monastic order is a standing institutional supply of men who satisfy it.

The two unions

Which is why both attempts at reunion failed, and failed in the same way.

Lyon, 1274. Michael VIII Palaiologos, who had recovered Constantinople from the Latins in 1261 and faced an Angevin invasion assembling in Italy, accepted union with Rome — papal primacy, the filioque, the right of appeal — as the price of papal restraint on Charles of Anjou. His envoys signed. The invasion was averted.

At home it was refused. The monks refused it, much of the episcopate refused it, and his own sister is reported to have said she would rather see her brother's empire ruined than the faith. He deposed the patriarch and imposed another; he imprisoned, exiled and mutilated opponents. **He got compliance from the hierarchy and never got the population.** He was excommunicated by Rome anyway in 1281 when the policy ceased to suit the pope, and when he died in 1282 he was denied Orthodox burial rites. His son repudiated the union immediately.

Ferrara-Florence, 1438–39. John VIII Palaiologos took over seven hundred people to Italy — the patriarch, the nominal representatives of the three fallen sees, bishops, theologians — and after eighteen months of debate the union was signed on 6 July 1439.

Mark of Ephesus refused to sign. He was the only bishop present who did, and his refusal is the whole of what the union was worth, because on returning to Constantinople he became the centre of the opposition and the union was never received. The patriarch died in Florence. Several signatories repudiated their signatures on reaching home. The union was not proclaimed in Hagia Sophia until December 1452, five months before the city fell, and the proclamation emptied the church.

A saying is attributed to the megas doux Loukas Notaras — that he would rather see the Turkish turban in the city than the Latin mitre. It is reported by the historian Doukas, its authenticity is disputed, and it is quoted here as attributed rather than as established. What is not disputed is that it expressed a widely held position.

What the refusal demonstrates

Both unions were agreed by the parties this sequence normally finds decisive — an emperor with an army, a patriarch, and a majority of the hierarchy — and both were void within a generation.

The reason is the one the Mughal and Investiture studies established from other directions: a formation the apex did not build is a formation the apex cannot renegotiate.

The Greek population's Orthodoxy was made in parishes and monasteries over a millennium, and by the thirteenth century it contained, as a formed component, the memory of 1204. An emperor signing a document in Italy had nothing with which to reach that. He could depose a patriarch; he could not make a congregation accept a priest who commemorated the pope.

And the monasteries gave the refusal an institutional form. In the Latin west, the laity's refusal of the Florentine union would have had no organisation. In the East it had Athos, Stoudios, and a network of houses with charters, land, prestige and men whose credibility rested on having refused advancement.

A counterweight requires both a disposition and a vehicle, and the eastern church had a permanent vehicle for the disposition that its emperors could not remove — because dissolving the monasteries would have destroyed the thing the emperor was trying to defend.

What a subject could do

The grading, as in the other studies.

A monk could refuse, publicly, at essentially no personal cost that he had not already accepted, and be believed precisely because of that. That is the strongest position available to a person without power in any case in this collection.

A bishop could refuse and be deposed — Mark of Ephesus did, and was protected by his standing and by the fact that the emperor needed the union to be received rather than merely signed.

A congregation could stay away, and did. The emptying of Hagia Sophia in the winter of 1452–53 is the strongest single act of popular refusal in this sequence.

A peasant could do nothing beyond that, and did not need to, because staying away was sufficient and cost him nothing.

That last is what makes this case different from every other in the collection. Everywhere else the ordinary person's refusal required something he did not have. Here the thing being demanded was his participation, and withholding participation is free.

Reading liberty against the framework

The first finding, and it is a sixth generator of plurality to add to the sequence's list. Earlier studies found counterweights arising from the technical form of institutions, from competitive bidding between authorities, from a ruler's instruments being confessionally shaped, from a plural patron, from an amnesty, and from a procedural change in an assembly's unit of account.

This case adds: **counterweights supplied by a standing institution of voluntary poverty.**

Its signature is distinctive. Its members satisfy the incapacity condition permanently and by profession rather than accidentally and once, as Joan did. It is self-recruiting, so the supply does not fail. It holds property but not on terms its members personally benefit from. It cannot be defunded without destroying the institution the ruler is trying to defend. And it is credible precisely in proportion to its refusal of the things the ruler has to offer.

Monasticism is an institutional factory for producing unbuyable witnesses, and any order that contains one has a counterweight its ruler cannot remove.

And the second finding, on where a legitimating agreement can be refused. Both unions were signed by everyone whose signature the framework would predict to be sufficient, and both failed.

Where what is being agreed is a change in the population's own religious practice, the population is a party to the agreement whether or not it is represented at the negotiation — because the agreement's performance requires its participation, and participation is the one thing that cannot be compelled from people who can simply stay home.

That is the general form of the finding and it is the sharpest thing this study has to say about the limits of apex authority. An emperor can depose a patriarch, appoint another, imprison the opposition and sign a treaty in Italy, and he cannot make a congregation say amen.

A note on sources.

The iconoclast controversy, the role of monastic opposition, the restoration of images in 843 and its commemoration as the Triumph of Orthodoxy are standard. The foundation of the monastic communities on Athos in the tenth century and their imperial charters of self-government are standard.

Michael VIII Palaiologos's acceptance of union at the Second Council of Lyon in 1274, its domestic repudiation, his coercion of opponents, his excommunication by Martin IV in 1281, the denial of burial rites at his death in 1282, and his son Andronikos II's repudiation of the union, are standard. The reported saying of his sister is as transmitted in the sources and is not verified here.

The Council of Ferrara-Florence, the Byzantine delegation of over seven hundred, the signing of the decree of union on 6 July 1439, Mark of Ephesus as the sole bishop present who refused to sign, the death of the patriarch Joseph II at Florence, the repudiation by returning signatories, and the proclamation of the union in Hagia

Sophia in December 1452, are standard.

The saying attributed to Loukas Notaras is reported by Doukas, is disputed in the scholarship, and is given in the text as attributed rather than established.

The identification of monasticism as a standing institutional supply of unbuyable witnesses, and the proposition that a population is a party to any agreement requiring its participation, are this study's, the second building on findings in the Mughal and Investiture studies in this sequence.

MODULE 10

THE FOURTH CRUSADE

Module 10 · change and collapse — the year a doctrinal difference became a memory of violence, and the four ways this schism could be said to have ended, none of which happened

1204

On 12–13 April 1204 an army raised to fight in Egypt took Constantinople by assault, and sacked it for three days.

The city had never been taken in eight hundred and seventy-four years. The sack was thorough: the churches were stripped, the reliquaries broken open and their contents dispersed across Latin Europe, the bronzes of the Hippodrome melted, the libraries burned, Hagia Sophia looted, and — in the account preserved by Niketas Choniates and by the pope's own letter of rebuke — a prostitute was set on the patriarch's throne to sing.

Innocent III had forbidden the attack on Christian cities and had excommunicated the crusaders for the earlier attack on Zara; when he learned what had been done at Constantinople he wrote in furious condemnation. He then accepted the outcome and appointed a Latin patriarch.

A Latin emperor ruled at Constantinople for fifty-seven years. A Latin patriarch sat in Hagia Sophia. The Greek hierarchy went into exile at Nicaea. The empire was recovered in 1261 and never recovered from it.

What that did to the schism

Everything in this study up to this point has established that the division was cheap, undramatic and unfelt by ordinary people. **1204 is where that stops.**

Before 1204 the schism was a disagreement between hierarchies about jurisdiction and a clause in the creed, of which the ordinary Greek Christian had no reason to be aware. After 1204 it was a memory, held by a population, of an army of Latin Christians sacking their city, desecrating their churches, and installing a foreign

patriarch in their cathedral.

A doctrinal difference is negotiable. A memory of violence is not, because it is not held by negotiators. It is held by everybody, it is transmitted in formation, and the parties who could sign an agreement about the doctrine have nothing with which to reach it.

That is why the unions of 1274 and 1439 failed, and it is the answer to the question of what made this schism permanent. **It was not made permanent by 1054, which cost nothing. It was made permanent by 1204, which cost everything and was inflicted rather than agreed.**

A costless schism becomes irreversible not when the disagreement deepens but when it acquires a body count, and the body count is what converts a hierarchical dispute into a popular one — which is to say, into the only kind that cannot be settled by hierarchs.

The four endings that did not happen

Set out the ways this division could have ended and it becomes clear why none of them was available.

By force — one side conquering the other and imposing its settlement. The West tried this, in effect, in 1204, and it produced fifty-seven years of Latin rule and a permanent hardening. It failed because, as Module 1 established, an authority whose value is non-seizability cannot be transferred by seizure, and a population's religion is not a thing an occupying army can change.

By agreement between the apexes — 1274 and 1439. Both were signed and both were refused, for the reason Module 9 established.

By a general council of the whole church — the eastern route. Impossible after 1453 because, as Module 8 established, the office that convened such councils ceased to exist.

By the disappearance of one party — which is what the East feared and which did not happen. The Ottoman conquest destroyed the eastern *empire* and preserved the eastern *church*, by making the patriarch the head of a *millet* with civil responsibility for the Orthodox population, a status that gave the church a continuity through four centuries of Muslim rule that it might not have had under Latin rule.

That is the case's final irony and it is not a rhetorical one. The Turkish conquest, which the union of Florence had been signed to prevent, secured the eastern church's independence from Rome more effectively than any council could have — because a patriarch who is a sultan's officer cannot submit to a pope, and a population

under Muslim rule has no reason to.

What survived

Sort the wreckage as this sequence does.

The empire died — in 1453, having been dying since 1204.

The offices survived, transformed. The patriarchate of Constantinople continued, under Ottoman appointment, with civil jurisdiction over the Orthodox community and the fiscal and political consequences that came with it.

The autocephalous structure grew. Deprived of an imperial centre, the eastern church became a family of self-governing national churches — a development already begun with the Bulgarian and Serbian patriarchates and completed in the Ottoman and modern periods, with Moscow declaring itself a patriarchate in 1589 and the nineteenth-century national churches following the new Balkan states.

And the schism survived everything, unrepaired, and is unrepaired. The mutual anathemas of 1054 were lifted by Paul VI and Athenagoras in December 1965, in a joint declaration expressing regret and consigning them to oblivion. **The declaration removed the excommunications and did not restore communion, which is exactly what one would expect of a formal act addressed to an event that was not the cause.**

Reading the collapse against the framework

The first finding. A schism that costs nothing is permanent because nobody needs to fix it; a schism that has acquired a memory of violence is permanent because the people who could fix it are not the people who hold the memory.

This one became permanent twice, by two different mechanisms, and the second is the one that binds. Had 1204 not happened, the union of 1439 might have been received; the Greek hierarchy signed it, after all, and the emperor wanted it. What made it unreceivable was a population formed with a specific grievance that no signature could address.

Where a division has produced an atrocity, the division has been transferred from the negotiators to the governed, and negotiation ceases to be the relevant instrument.

The second finding, and it is the one that answers the question this study was set. The initial guess was that the split affected nobody's title and that this would change the dynamics. It is correct and the change is total.

A schism between authorities who authorise nothing for each other has no repair mechanism, because a repair mechanism is built out of the costs the division imposes on parties able to act. The western schism of 1378 imposed costs on every prelate and crown in Latin Europe, and those parties built a repair in thirty-nine years. The eastern schism imposed costs on nobody with the standing to act, and no repair was ever built. When a cost finally arrived — the Turkish advance — it fell on the party with the least power, and the terms available to it were surrender.

The absence of a shared authorisation removes the crisis and removes the remedy in the same act, and this case is what that looks like over nine hundred and seventy years.

A note on sources.

The capture and sack of Constantinople on 12–13 April 1204, the dispersal of relics into Latin Europe, the destruction of the Hippodrome bronzes, and the desecration of Hagia Sophia including the episode reported by Niketas Choniates, are standard; Innocent III's prior prohibition, his excommunication of the crusaders after Zara, and his letter of condemnation on learning of the sack, followed by his acceptance of the outcome and the appointment of a Latin patriarch, are standard. The Latin empire from 1204 to 1261 and the Greek government in exile at Nicaea are standard.

The unions of 1274 and 1439 and their repudiation are treated in Modules 5 and 9 with their sources. The fall of Constantinople on 29 May 1453 is standard.

The Ottoman *millet* arrangement and the patriarch's civil status are treated in Modules 6 and 8. The Bulgarian and Serbian patriarchates, the establishment of the patriarchate of Moscow in 1589, and the autocephaly of the nineteenth-century Balkan national churches, are standard.

The joint declaration of Paul VI and Athenagoras of 7 December 1965 lifting the anathemas of 1054, and the fact that it did not restore communion, are standard.

The propositions that a division acquiring an atrocity transfers from negotiators to the governed, and that the absence of a shared authorisation removes both the crisis and the remedy, are this study's.

MODULE 11

THE PARTY THAT PAID

Module 11 · the grim accounting — a division whose costs were almost entirely deferred, and then presented, in full, to one side

The first column

Set down what came of it.

Two mature Christian civilisations rather than one. Whatever else is true, the Latin west and the Orthodox east each produced, over the following centuries, a body of theology, liturgy, art, law and learning that the other did not and could not have. Scholasticism and canon law on one side; the hesychast tradition, the icon and the Byzantine liturgy on the other. Neither would exist in its actual form had the two halves remained a single administrative church.

A durable structure. The eastern church's autocephalous form survived the loss of its empire, four centuries of Muslim rule, two centuries of Russian state control and one of atheist persecution, and is intact. That is a record of institutional survival that this collection has nothing to match.

And, from the other side of the ledger of this whole sequence: the West's development into something else. The papal monarchy, the universities, canon law, the conciliar tradition, and eventually the whole apparatus of European constitutional argument, are the products of an institution that had to build authority without a state — which it had to do because Constantinople was not going to supply one.

The second column

1204. The single largest entry. A city of perhaps hundreds of thousands sacked for three days by an army of fellow Christians, its churches stripped, its libraries burned, its relics carried off, its empire dismembered and ruled by foreigners for fifty-seven years. No figure is offered for the dead.

The Latin ecclesiastical settlements in southern Italy, the crusader states and the Greek lands, in which populations were reorganised under bishops of another rite by whoever held the ground.

Michael VIII's coercion after 1274, in which a Byzantine emperor imprisoned, exiled and mutilated his own subjects to enforce a union they refused.

1453, and everything that followed for the Christian populations of the Ottoman Balkans and Anatolia — a subject far beyond this study, entered here only because the union of Florence was signed to prevent it and did not.

And the four centuries of unrepaired division itself, whose cost is nearly invisible year by year and whose total is a Christendom that could not combine when combination would have mattered.

The shape of the record

The documentary condition here is the worst in this sequence and it should be stated plainly.

There is no single archive of the schism, because there was no institution of the schism. **There are two traditions that stopped attending to each other**, each documenting its own affairs well and the other's badly, with the material on the relation concentrated at a few moments — 1054, 1204, 1274, 1439 — and thin between them.

And the two most important events for this study are documented by their victims and their perpetrators respectively, with almost nothing in between. **The sack of 1204 is known mainly from Niketas Choniates, who was there and lost everything, and from western accounts written to justify it.** That is a normal historian's position and it is not the condition this framework's method requires.

Where a division is constituted by drift, the record is not a record of the division but two records of two things, and a study must be explicit that it is constructing the relation rather than reading it.

They do not net

The columns are, as always in this sequence, one transaction seen from two ends.

The eastern church's extraordinary durability is a function of its autocephalous, undecidable, unforkable structure — which is the same structure that could not hold a council after 787 and cannot settle a jurisdictional dispute today. The West's constitutional inventiveness is a function of an institution that had to argue because it had no state — which is the same condition that produced the papal fiscal machine and the grievance of 1517.

Each half's achievement and each half's pathology are the same structural fact seen from opposite sides, and the two halves together constitute the nearest thing to a controlled experiment this collection has: one religion, one origin, two constitutional positions, a thousand years.

Reading the accounting against the framework

The finding, on deferred costs. This study has established that the division was cheap to maintain and that its costs were deferred. The accounting shows where the deferral landed.

A cost deferred is a cost transferred, and it is transferred to whichever party is weakest when it finally falls due. Between 1054 and 1200 either side could have paid a modest price for reunion and neither needed to. By 1439 only one side needed it, and by then the price was submission and the payer was a state with three months of life in it.

The party that benefits from a costless division is whichever one will still be strong when the bill arrives, and neither party knows in advance which that is. In 1054 an observer would have said the empire was the durable one and the bishop of Rome the precarious one, and the observer would have been looking at a pope who had just been captured in battle by Normans.

And the second finding, on controlled comparisons. The eastern and western churches after 1054 are as close as history comes to running one tradition twice under different constitutional arrangements. The divergence is very large and it is almost entirely explained by position: who had a state, who convened, where the money came from, and whether the founding transaction was within argumentative memory.

Where a single tradition divides and the halves run separately, the divergence measures the causal weight of position against doctrine — and on this evidence the weight of position is decisive, since the doctrine was held in common at the start and the arrangements were not.

A note on sources.

No figures are given anywhere in this study for populations, casualties, revenue, or the size of any city or army, because the surviving material does not support them; that includes the sack of 1204, for which the mortality is not recoverable.

Niketas Choniates as the principal Greek eyewitness account of 1204, and the western accounts of the Fourth Crusade, are standard, as is the observation that the two bodies of testimony have opposite interests.

The Latin ecclesiastical settlements in southern Italy, the crusader states and the Greek lands are treated in Modules 5 and 7. Michael VIII's coercion of opponents after 1274 is treated in Module 9.

The durability of the eastern church through Ottoman, Russian synodal and Soviet periods is standard and is stated in general terms only.

The propositions that a deferred cost is transferred to whichever party is weakest when it falls due, and that a divided tradition constitutes a measure of position against doctrine, are this study's.

MODULE 12

TWO ARCHITECTURES

Module 12 · convergence and divergence — the two ways of building a source of title, the two corresponding failures, and the strongest case for the eastern arrangement, stated fully and answered

What the sequence now has

Seven studies have examined one problem. Force compels and cannot make obedience owed. Somewhere there must be a party who can declare that obedience is owed, and the declaration is worth having only because the ruler could not have produced it.

The catalogue of failure modes now runs: **capture, compulsion, purchase, starvation, hollowing, expenditure, forking** — and this case adds an eighth which is not a failure at all in the ordinary sense.

Divorce. Two authorities that authorise nothing for each other cease to be in communion. No title is transferred, no office vacated, no holding made insecure. The instrument on each side goes on working exactly as before.

And divorce is permanent, precisely because it is costless. Every other failure in the catalogue produces pressure, and pressure produces repair or collapse. This one produces neither, and runs indefinitely.

The two architectures

Underneath, the case supplies the sequence's clearest structural statement, and it concerns the two available designs for an institution that must decide collectively.

Convening inside. The institution's own head convokes. This is the western design after the Gregorian reform, and its properties are: a single addressee, maximal reach, capturability — which is why the Investiture Contest was worth fifty years — corporate self-repair, since a body exists that can act, and **forkability**, since a disputed occupancy of the convening office stops everything. It failed in 1378 and was repaired by importing an outside enforcer and borrowing a convocation from a departing claimant, and it then abolished the repair.

Convening outside. A political authority convokes. This is the eastern design, and its properties are the mirror image: no single addressee, redundancy across several sees, unforkability, since there is no office to contest, and **contingency on the survival of the convener.** It never had an investiture contest, never had a conciliar crisis, and has held no ecumenical council since the empire that convened them ceased to exist.

There is no third design, and that is the finding. A body cannot convene itself, because a self-constituted body has the defect of a self-authorising ruler — which Pisa demonstrated in 1409 by producing a third pope. The convening power must be inside, where it can be disputed, or outside, where it can be lost.

One church took both options, one in each half, and each suffered exactly the corresponding failure. That is as close to a controlled demonstration as this sequence will get.

And the four faces

Which permits the sequence's accumulated proposition to be stated as settled.

Reach, capturability, forkability and corporate decisiveness are four faces of one property, and no institution chooses among them separately.

The Islamic *'ulamā'*, personally licensed: uncapturable, unforkable, unbindable, incapable of corporate action, and still there after fourteen centuries.

The Latin church, institutionally credentialled with an internal convener: enormous reach, capturable, forkable, capable of assembling at Constance and deposing three popes.

The eastern church, institutionally credentialled with an external convener: unforkable, undecidable after 1453, and the most durable structure in the collection.

Durability and decisiveness are traded against each other and the exchange rate is not negotiable.

The strongest case for the eastern arrangement

Stated as its best advocate would state it.

You have written a study about an institution that cannot hold a council. Consider what it did not do.

It never claimed that its bishop could depose kings. It never fought a fifty-year war over who appoints a bishop. It never taxed the whole of Christendom to fund a court in one city. It never produced two popes, or three. It never sold an indulgence to build a basilica. It never burned a Bohemian priest to prove that its constitutional revolution was orthodox.

It kept the faith of the seven councils without adding to the creed, held that doctrine is defined by the whole church and not by one bishop, and preserved a liturgy and a tradition of prayer that has been in continuous use for fifteen hundred years. When its empire died it did not die with it. It survived four centuries under a Muslim government, two under Russian state control, and one under a state committed to its extinction, and it is still here — which is more than can be said for the Christendom that reformed itself into fragments in the sixteenth century over a fiscal instrument its eastern brethren had never needed to invent.

You call it undecisive. It calls itself conservative, and points out that an institution which cannot easily change also cannot easily be changed by the wrong people. Measure it by what it preserved.

The answer

Most of that is true and the last point is the strongest.

The preservation is real and this study concedes it without qualification. An institution that survived 1453, 1721 and 1917 with its liturgy, its orders and its faith intact has demonstrated something that no western church can match, and the demonstration is not accidental — it is the direct product of having no capturable apex, which is what the whole sequence has been examining from the other side.

But the arrangement's virtues and its incapacity are the same fact. It never fought over episcopal appointment because the emperor made the appointments and no doctrine existed with which to object; that is not restraint, it is a settled question. It never taxed Christendom because it had a treasury; that is not asceticism, it is a funding position. It never produced two popes because it had no single office to contest.

And the cost of the design was paid in full and by one party. The eastern church could not convene after 1453 because it had lodged its convening power in an emperor, and when the price of survival came due — the fifteenth century, the Turkish advance, the need for an army — the East had to buy a doctrine with a submission and could not make it stick, because the population it needed to ratify the submission had been formed with 1204 in it.

And the western half's costs were equally real and equally structural, which the earlier studies in this sequence have entered at length: the schism of 1378, the Reformation, the wars of religion. Neither architecture is superior. Each avoided precisely the disaster the other suffered and suffered precisely the one the other avoided.

Now the concession, and it is the answer to the question the study was set.

The initial hypothesis was that the split affected nobody's title, and that this would change the dynamics. It did, and the change is the whole case.

A schism that transfers no authorisation is not a crisis, and therefore never becomes one, and therefore is never fixed. The western schism of 1378 was the worst thing that ever happened to the Latin church and was over in thirty-nine years, because everybody's benefice depended on it. The eastern schism was barely noticed at the time and has lasted nine hundred and seventy years, because nobody's did.

What is unbearable gets repaired. What is merely wrong does not.

That is the sequence's most useful sentence about institutions and it was not available from any of the six preceding cases, all of which examined ruptures that hurt. It took a rupture that cost nothing to show that cost is the repair mechanism — and that an institution's capacity to correct itself is a function not of its wisdom but of the pain its errors inflict on parties able to act.

A note on sources.

The comparisons in this module rest on the six preceding studies in this sequence, where the material is documented.

The properties of the eastern and western arrangements as set out here follow from the evidence assembled in the preceding modules and in the western schism study; the claim that there is no third option for the location of a convening power is argued in Module 8 and is this study's.

The counter-position is composed, not quoted. It is an attempt to state the case for the eastern arrangement as its best advocate would state it, drawing on claims that appear across the historiography and the confessional literature rather than on any single author, and it is answered point by point rather than dismissed.

This study takes no position on the theological questions in dispute between the two churches, on which of the two ecclesiologies is correct, or on the validity of the union of Florence. Its analysis is structural and its inability to adjudicate the theology is not evidence about the theology.

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